

Message Text

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ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-10 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NASA-01 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01
DOE-15 CEQ-01 OES-07 SS-15 ICA-11 /161 W
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P 110540Z MAY 78
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1301
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01907

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, UN, UR, US
SUBJECT: US/SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON THE SPECIAL
SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

1. SUMMARY: IN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON SSOD AT SOVIET UN
MISSION ON MAY 10, SOVIET PERMREP TROYANOVSKY
INDICATED HIS EXPECTATION THAT THEIR PLENARY STATEMENT
WOULD INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THE NEUTRON BOMB
ALONG LINES OF BREZHNEV'S KOMSOMOL SPEECH. AMBASSADOR
LEONARD EMPHASIZED THAT AGITATING THIS ISSUE WOULD
BE VIEWED BY US AS UNHELPFUL AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE.
TROYANOVSKY ALSO EXPRESSED VIEW THAT BREZHNEV FORMULATION
ON NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES IS MORE EXTENSIVE THAN
STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE 32ND UNGA
AND COULD LEAD TO NON-ALIGNED PRESSURE ON THE WEST FOR
COMPARABLE ASSURANCES. LEONARD REVIEWED HIS RECENT
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CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW AND PARIS, AND TROYANOVSKY
DESCRIBED HIS RECENT TALKS WITH THE INDIANS AND AUSTRIANS
ON MACHINERY ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADORS LEONARD AND MCHENRY MET WITH TROYANOVSKY,
FOKINE AND TULINOV AT SMUN TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE
SSOD AND NAMIBIA. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS ON THE PORTION

OF THE DISCUSSION DEALING WITH THE SSOD. AT THE OUTSET, AMBASSADOR LEONARD REVIEWED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL HIS RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW AND PARIS, FOCUSING MAINLY ON MACHINERY ISSUES AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF THE CCD. MOSCOW 9417 AND PARIS 14099 CONTAIN SUMMARIES OF THOSE CONSULTATIONS.

3. SOVIET/AUSTRIAN DISCUSSION: TROYANOVSKY INFORMED US THAT AUSTRIAN PERMREP JANKOWITSCH HAD SOUGHT HIM OUT AT END OF PREPCOM V TO INDICATE AUSTRIA'S STRONG INTEREST IN BECOMING A MEMBER OF AN ENLARGED CCD. JANKOWITSCH, HAD INDICATED A VERY CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDE ON OTHER POSSIBLE CCD REFORMS, EG HE WAS AGAINST ALLOWING OBSERVERS TO CCD MEETINGS. JANKOWITSCH HAD SUGGESTED THAT A BALANCED ENLARGEMENT COULD BE AS FOLLOWS: SOCIALIST -- CUBA AND VIETNAM; WESTERN -- AUSTRALIA AND NORWAY; AND NON-ALIGNED/NEUTRAL -- ALGERIA AND AUSTRIA. TROYANOVSKY SAID HE EXPRESSED DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER CUBA AND VIETNAM, WHICH REGARDED THEMSELVES AS MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED GROUP, WOULD WANT TO COUNT THEMSELVES AS SOCIALIST STATES IN ORDER TO FACILITATE "BALANCED ENLARGEMENT" OF THE CCD.

4. SOVIET/INDIAN DISCUSSION: TROYANOVSKY ALSO DESCRIBED TO US HIS DISCUSSION WITH INDIAN MFA UNDERSECRETARY VELLODI AT END OF PREPCOM V. VELLODI
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HAD TOLD HIM THAT MAJOR ISSUES FOR INDIA AT THE SSOD WERE: A) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION B) THE CALL FOR THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO GIVE A TOTAL COMMITMENT ON NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND C) MACHINERY ISSUES. TROYANOVSKY SAID THE INDIAN POSITION ON MACHINERY WAS ADMIRABLY CONSERVATIVE. THE INDIANS DO NOT WANT MAJOR CHANGES IN THE CCD. THEY FAVOR RECONVENING THE UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AS A WAY TO HOLD OUT TO INDIAN PUBLIC OPINION THE PROSPECT OF EVENTUAL CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT EFFORTS AND TO REDUCE PRESSURES FOR ENLARGEMENT OF THE CCD. NOTE: SEVERAL OTHER DELS HAVE HIGHLIGHTED TO US THE INDIAN TEXTS (IN THE DECLARATION AND PROGRAM OF ACTION) INTRODUCED AT PREPCOM V WHICH CHARACTERIZE ANY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY. THEY BELIEVE THAT DESAI WILL MAKE THIS A MAJOR THEME IN HIS PLENARY SPEECH.

5. NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES. TROYANOVSKY CALLED OUR ATTENTION TO BREZHNEV'S NEW FORMULATION ON NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES AS CONTAINED IN HIS

APRIL 25 SPEECH. HE NOTED THAT THIS FORMULA GOES BEYOND THE POSITION TAKEN BY PRESIDENT CARTER IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE 32ND UNGA AND ASKED WHETHER US WOULD BE ABLE TO SUPPORT IT. THE BREZHNEV FORMULA, HE SAID, COULD LEAD SOME OF THE NON-ALIGNED TO ASK THE US FOR COMPARABLE ASSURANCES. LEONARD SAID THAT IT WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT US COULD ACCEPT THE BREZHNEV FORMULA SINCE THIS WOULD AFFECT OUR NATO OBLIGATIONS. THE ISSUE OF NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES, HOWEVER, WAS UNDER ACTIVE REVIEW IN WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS IN LONDON. VARIOUS NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES MIGHT THEREFORE OFFER SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FORMULATIONS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01907

AT THE SSOD BUT THE NET EFFECT MIGHT WELL BE TO ASSURE THE NON-ALIGNED THAT THEY ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS COULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO PROMOTING OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES.

6. ERW. AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION, LEONARD TOLD TROYANOVSKY THAT IN OUR VIEW IT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL FOR THE SOVIETS TO RAISE THE NEUTRON BOMB ISSUE AT THE SPECIAL SESSION. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD MADE THE SAME POINT IN HIS CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW. IT WOULD

NOT HELP US/SOVIET RELATIONS TO HAVE A POLEMICAL
EXCHANGE ON THIS ISSUE IN NEW YORK. TROYANOVSKY
REPLIED THAT IT WAS HIS ASSUMPTION THAT, GIVEN THE
REFERENCE TO THE NEUTRON BOMB ISSUE IN THE KOMSOMOL
SPEECH, THE MATTER WOULD ALSO BE RAISED IN THEIR
PLENARY STATEMENT TO THE SSOD. YOUNG
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